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things as sin, or ‘breaking the Law’, where the
Aboriginal view is not simply that it is a guilty
individual’s own personal burden, as it is seen
in the West, but becomes a family or community
responsibility involving kin-based forms of restor-
ing the equilibrium. And while the transcendent
Christian God awaits for his saved souls to arrive
in a place untouched by earthly problems and
evil, Aboriginal spirits of Dreaming ancestors and
deceased relatives exist with an ‘egalitarian’ im-
manence, occupying the same landscape as the
living, looking after them in some instances, and
even travelling around with them in the backs
of utes. (32)
This study presents a very accessible approach
to understanding the complexities of the devel-
oping postcolonial relationship between Chris-
tian Aboriginal locals and the churches in Halls
Creek. It must be noted, though, that a work
attempting such an enormous scope cannot help
but make certain generalisations or take neces-
sary shortcuts in some instances. Of the three
churches that operate around Halls Creek, the
Catholic, the United Aborigines Mission (UAM)
and the Assemblies of God (AOG), I found my
curiosity regarding the Catholic church was left
a little wanting. McDonald notes early in the
book that her involvement with the Catholic
church was limited, resulting in a correspondingly
limited analysis. She does mention throughout
that the Catholic church has been far more
culturally aware and sensitive than the other two
churches, even allowing some Aboriginal prac-
tices to be acceptable within their Christian
hegemony (73), especially since the mid-1960s.
But this church does deserve greater depth of
treatment, especially because of the relationship
McDonald mentions between the mainly Prot-
estant people of mixed descent and their more
Catholic-affiliated ‘traditional relatives’. (8) This
is a crucial relationship considering the described
antagonisms that exist between the churches,
begging the question of how these are dealt with
by relatives under the different denominations.
When re-establishing their links to the land and
each other through their shared activities away
from the churches’ scrutiny, as McDonald points
out, do these kin leave behind their Christian
or ‘half-Christian’ (92) selves, or is the universal-
ist approach of Christianity an attribute to be
also shared, regardless of differentiating church
loyalties?
This leads to some related questions. What is
the relationship between Christian and non-
Christian people in the township, especially that
of relatives? To what degree does the individual-
ism inherent in Christianity affect the sense of
Aboriginal community? This is addressed to some
extent, McDonald noting that ‘in times of crisis
... family solidarity becomes all-important, and
family directives override church affiliation’, (171)
but I was left wondering what sorts of pressures
or divisions, if any, are experienced by people
during the quieter, ordinary times. McDonald also
observes that the denigration of Aboriginality by
the Church (especially the AOG, and the UAM
to a lesser extent) has led to self-deprecation being
internalised by people—‘[a] phrase commonly
heard around Halls Creek is, “I’m just a rubbish
blackfella”’ (81)—although it is later stated that
‘Traditional values, particularly kinship values of
balanced reciprocity and justice, remain strong.’
(165) There appears to be something of a con-
tradiction here leading to the question, ‘Why
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A few years ago I was asked by an editor of the
cultural studies list at Routledge’s London office
to edit a three-volume collection of critical litera-
ture on Deleuze and Guattari. The prospect that
cultural studies might lay claim to Deleuze and
Guattari was perhaps predictably met with con-
sternation by editors of the philosophy list.
For what strange creature would result from
the meetings of Deleuze, Guattari and cultural
studies? But this was precisely what interested
me as an editor. I am not alone in this. The same
question interests Ian Buchanan, who ‘wonders
what a Deleuzian, that is, transcendental empiri-
cist cultural studies would look like’.1 And it is
also what interests Claire Colebrook, enough
for her to publish two ‘introductory’ Deleuze
books in the same year—this one for a cultural
studies list and the other for literary studies.2
Colebrook poses the problem of what cultural
studies would look like with a Deleuzian con-
ception of difference instead of the negative one
it has inherited from structuralism’s logic of
representation (where images are yoked to a pre-
imaged foundation).
While contextualising Deleuze’s philosophy
in such studies could be unDeleuzian because
it would make texts mean instead of allowing
them to work (that is, concepts might be put
up on blocks, leaving them to rust, like a broken-
down car), as Colebrook well knows, her pursuit
of the task is for that reason no less genuine.
Introductions have the potential power to arrest
a thought’s becoming, as do glossaries (which
the book contains up front), for the sake of
what an introduction is—formatted, acceptable,
publishable, profitable—in conformity with an
image of its passive readership. We used to ask
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McDonald’s aim is to explain how and not just
simply why Aboriginal people become Christian-
ised in the east Kimberley town of Halls Creek.
The reasons why, as McDonald explores in the
first few chapters, are easy enough to understand.
After a general overview of the ‘flow theories’ on
Indigenous life, in which ‘Aboriginal people do
not recognise a psychic centralism’ (23) but
instead view an affective inter-connectedness
between everything, we are then taken on a
whirlwind tour of the foundations of Christi-
anity. Although it is worth pointing out that by
McDonald’s reckoning only around a quarter of
the Aboriginal population in Halls Creek today
identify as Christian, the theological deconstruc-
tion she undertakes is, I believe, a valuable, and
indeed essential, exercise for understanding the
attraction of Christianity for Aboriginal people
in general.
McDonald suggests that a religion’s power is
tied to a peoples’ own conceptions of life force,
place and belonging, and in this respect the Bible
is a ‘colonial document’ describing acts of dispos-
session and displacement, exile and diaspora.
(5) Drawing on Foucault’s historiographical
method and Bakhtin’s study of narrative con-
struction,7 McDonald explains how Christianity
eventually developed into an universal religion
from previous agriculturally based cosmologies,
delivering a disembodied utopian answer to the
historical waves of invasion and colonisation by
successive empires. This was achieved through
positing a dualism of reality, with the ‘true home’
of the spiritual realm taking precedence over
the material world, thereby overcoming the
problem of losing the sense of one’s own home-
land or being forced into subjugation. Following
this, it becomes apparent why Christianity has
been so appealing to some Kimberley people.
(80) Having initially experienced the traumatic
dispossession of their land and a secondary
displacement from station life (where they were
still in touch with the land), groups were finally
forced onto the missions and into reserves around
town. Once in town, the Protestant churches
began to preach about the virtues of a work ethic
to people who had very little chance of gaining
employment, and continuously reminded them
not to worry about land or possessions in this
life as it was the next life that was important.
The problem, of course, is that the evangelists’
promises of utopian salvation were themselves
another form of colonisation. The complex and
complicit relationship between politics and reli-
gion becomes strikingly evident when the analysis
examines how Christianity further developed in
response to the political organisation of hierar-
chical and patriarchal city-states and monarchies,
and then became increasingly more individual-
orientated through the Renaissance and in line
with the development of capitalism. (30) This,
for me, was one of the book’s major attractions,
allowing the reader to draw a straightforward
understanding of how gradual socio-economic
changes were incorporated within the Christian
cosmology. Not only this, it also illustrated just
how different this was to Aboriginal world views
and values. As McDonald states, ‘The basic con-
flict in values between Western Christianity and
Aboriginal world views has not been erased by
Aboriginal conversion to Christianity. Aboriginal
Christians see themselves as “following a way”
rather than transforming a core self or essential
being’. (181) This difference is reflected in such
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ourselves in semiotics: how many times can one
introduce C.S. Peirce’s thought? An introduc-
tion, in short, may be a motor of thought that
won’t turn over and, even if it did, its wheels
are no longer touching the ground. As Colebrook
acknowledges: ‘the problem with any intro-
duction to Deleuze is that it will have to use
all those methods, of metaphor, generalisation
and example, against which his thought was
directed’. (94) This is not fatal, of course, but
one has to be careful about which examples (for
instance, one’s own?) can be generalised.
Deleuzian philosophy has for Colebrook a
kind of Marxian imperative to transform life.
Thinking is embedded in life’s fluxes and, far
from being static, is transformative and com-
plicating, leading the way to what life might
become, in all of its pulsing, chaotic nuances.
This is the direction that Colebrook points her
readers, bringing out that the challenge of De-
leuzian thought is to ‘see life as a problem’, in
fact, a series of problems that thinking encoun-
ters and ceaselessly produces: historically, for
instance, structuralism, political representation
and the politicisation of representation (especially
the ‘expanded perception’ of the forces, histories,
assumptions, prejudices, and powers beyond
ourselves producing the world we inhabit). This
approach is expressed by the keyword difference
as variously prehuman or inhuman (focusing on
geologic or technologic). Philosophy’s work is
to create and assess concepts that allow for the
emergence of difference.
There is, as Colebrook underlines, a radical
decentering of the human in Deleuze: ‘we need
to rethink the notion of the human decision; for
it is less the case that we decide who “we” are
than that forces “decide” us’. (xlii) We may thus
add Deleuze to that pantheon of thinkers who
exploded the naive self-love of human being—
Copernicus–Darwin–Freud (self-nominating)—
in getting beyond and before and aside ‘the hu-
man point of view’. Yet this is too handy an
account. Deleuze swerves from Darwin (and then
from Freud), as Colebrook explains, in his efforts
to get ‘beyond’ representation as a kind of ‘com-
mon sense’ about the subject’s duty to copy the
external world into thought (in a nutshell, repre-
sentation domesticates difference). To this end
she deploys the example of the virtual power of
evolution conceived as ‘a capacity or potential
for change and becoming which passes through
organisms’ (2) against a maintenance and selec-
tion model focused on the creation of species
and organisms. Further, Colebrook shows how
Deleuze sought in traditionally non-philosophical
thought—like stupidity in the pursuit its own
perversities—a way around common sense
(dominated by ‘dogmatic image[s] of thought’).
Indeed, the two great models of difference—
genetic and dialectical as opposed to synchronic
and structural—were accepted by Deleuze as
problems (13) without acceding to the conse-
quences of an orientation either towards an origin
(consciousness) or system (language). Rather, the
ground of Deleuzian difference is itself. Thus,
this difference is ‘positive’ and thinking about it
in this manner is difficult (an ‘eternal challenge’,
14) against the tendency of common sense to
fall back upon ‘already given entities’ and sub-
ordinate difference to fixity, sets of relations and
representation. For ‘difference is itself different
in each of its affirmations’, which entails it is
neither common nor systemic. (27)
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missionaries were also known to have learnt local
languages, if only to make their efforts at con-
version all the more successful. John Harris points
out that while this practice may have been based
on ulterior motives, it was still highly regarded
by some Aboriginal people.3 However one looks
at it, the fact is that the relationship remains
complex. Many Aboriginal people today actively
identify and engage themselves as Christian, and
for this reason work such as McDonald’s is invalu-
able for understanding the contemporary signifi-
cance of this religion’s influence.
Blood, Bones and Spirit is an absorbing critical
analysis detailing the interface between Aborigi-
nality and Christianity, written by an ‘insider’ who
has had a foot in both camps. McDonald intro-
duces herself as coming from a ‘long family line
of Christian missionaries and evangelists’, and
as having initially spent three years studying
at a missionary bible college. Her humanitarian
concerns then led her to work in remote areas
as an Aboriginal community health worker dur-
ing the 1970s and 1980s. Although she does not
elucidate on the reasons for her eventual transfor-
mation into a ‘post-Christian’ (itself an interesting
and worthwhile topic for reflection), McDonald
decided instead to study anthropology at the
University of Queensland and then the Australian
National University. At the latter she undertook
her dissertation, and this insightful book is the
result. McDonald’s personal involvement with
Christianity and the communities has given solid
credence to her experience with the Church’s
ongoing influence in the Kimberley, and raised
important questions for her regarding the
Church’s associations with colonialism and the
processes of postcolonialism.
The ubiquity of Christianity in the colonial
process is a point made clear by Ronald and
Catherine Berndt who, with over forty years of
professional practice as anthropologists, noted
that:
Only on rare occasions have we carried out
anthropological research in an area that was
not directly or indirectly affected by mis-
sionary activity ... [There] are few Aborigines
who have not been exposed in some degree,
at first hand or otherwise, to some form of
proselytization.4
As is to be expected from such an observation,
much has been written on the general history of
Christianity and its missions in Australia. This
literature ranges from the extensive Australia-
wide documentation of missions by John Harris,
as well as his almost apologetic and exonerating
follow-up volume, through to the interesting
collection of diverse essays edited by the ‘first
Aboriginal person to earn a PhD in Religious
Studies’,5 Anne Pattel-Gray. Some important and
well-known anthropological studies on mission-
ary encounters and the movement of Christian-
based cults are available in the comprehensive
collection of essays edited by Tony Swain and
Deborah Bird Rose. Also, the early texts of the
missionaries themselves, for example those by
the South Australian-based Clamor Schurmann,
Christian Teichelmann and George Taplin, have
proven crucial to both historians and to projects
of cultural revival for their information on local
languages and for providing a (con)textual back-
ground to the colonial encounter.6
As the new arrival to this body of literature,
Blood, Bones and Spirit covers a lot of ground.
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Colebrook very delicately parses ideas of
difference in their negative forms through dis-
cussions of structuralism and psychoanalysis in
order to get to the positive Deleuzian version
(though she seems overgenerous to Lévi-Strauss
in emphasising his sociological apprehension
of the generative power of collective life which
is hardly original to him, 18). She explains why
Deleuze rejects a conception of desire as lack
based on a negative conception of linguistic
difference and its oedipal (ultimately capitalist)
prohibitive coding—‘difference [is] a law [of
the father] to which we are subjected, a law
that deprives us of immediacy and presence
[of the lost plenitude of the mother’s body]’. (24)
A positive conception of difference cannot be
grounded on an absence (or perhaps equally,
an illusion of an ‘undifferentiated ground’ out-
side difference, 30ff) whose recovery a human
being forever strives to regain, which thus makes
the death drive fundamental for psychoanalysis
for such a recovery is the loss of self; neither is
difference reducible to that which emanates from
an undifferentiated source. ‘Life itself is differ-
ential … and difference is singular because each
event of life differentiates itself differently’. (28)
The implications of Deleuze’s offer of, then,
only internal or immanent, as opposed to ex-
ternal or transcendent, explanations of differ-
ence, are pursued with great rigor and clarity
through the topics of Deleuze’s transcendental
method, the univocal plane of becoming, desire,
synthesis of flows into stable identities, intensive,
productive and connective sexual difference, and
how language reduces difference. It would have
been interesting if Colebrook had considered
the internal diversity of structuralism because
it comes off as a kind of monolithic difference
arrester. I also appreciated how she got Guattari
into the mix by pointing out that he directly
politicised Deleuze’s philosophical analyses of
perception and difference. (34) But more work
is undoubtedly needed on this point because
Guattari is barely a factor when the discussion
turns to micropolitics and the important distinc-
tion between subjugated and subject groups
(58ff); although the latter loses none of its politi-
cal import as Colebrook very successfully reloads
it with problems of racism, nationalism and
Aboriginality.
Colebrook writes: ‘Deleuze’s task is to think
the plane of immanent difference without pro-
viding yet one more image that would explain
difference in general.’ (86) How not to subject
difference to a single image becomes a major
philosophical task for Deleuze. Thought’s en-
counter with difference in its multiple forms
engages in ‘intensity management’ strategies in
which units are abstracted, flows are connected,
intensities composed, and beings are produced.
Deleuze asks us to think past these ‘molar forma-
tions’ to the qualities (contracted and elevated)
of which they consist in the effort to confront
difference. In the process, philosophy changes
in each encounter with difference; this makes
it interdisciplinary, as Colebrook explains, in an
elevated sense (creative and affirmative) beyond
simple borrowing and novel combinations of
concepts without any real commitments beyond
writing grants. Philosophy never rests in its
effort to conceptualise the ways in which, and
how, difference is revealed in each event, work,
perception. A warning, of sorts, follows: ‘The
minute we take any voice as exemplary we have
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If anthropology came to be known as the ‘hand-
maiden’ of colonialism, then Christianity can
easily be regarded as its ‘godfather’. In fact, as
Heather McDonald notes, in conjunction with
the physical spread of the British Empire, mis-
sionary practice was busy trying to produce a
parallel empire of its own: an ‘Empire of the
Spirit’. When land and resources were being
systematically seized from indigenous territories
across the so-called New World and beyond,
Christianity was a primary agent of the colo-
nising process. Missions may have provided
refuge for the survivors of the first waves of
frontier terror and violence, yet many of the basic
assumptions made about indigenous people
were already upheld or, at the very least, in-
formed by Christian beliefs. In the case of Aus-
tralia, as elsewhere, ‘the natives’ were generally
perceived, and disdained, as primitive heathens
bound by superstition and under the guidance
of the Devil. And, as one of McDonald’s inform-
ants suggests, ‘That’s why God never like the
corroboree’.1
Even so, the role of missions in the colonial
history of Australia is ambiguous. For those who
consider the missionaries’ activities as blatant
cultural genocide and manipulative psycho-social
engineering, Christianity’s part in the attempted
destruction of indigenous cultures is beyond
doubt. For others, the fact that missions were
basically the only ‘saving grace’ of many people
who may have otherwise died without their help
is enough to redeem their presence and indoc-
trinations. Missionaries, such as the Strehlow
family, collected large amounts of cultural infor-
mation and material from groups that could have
been otherwise stolen, lost or destroyed.2 Some
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elevated one particular mode of thinking and
speaking as a general model. We have ceased
to think.’ (97)
It is likewise for desire. A single form of desire
(the ‘miserable story’ of lack) ‘turns against life’.
(100) It is necessary to turn away from lack, away
from the subject–object division, towards life as
desire and flow, loosened from representation,
back to the prepersonal flux before the forma-
tion of subjects who desire, into the world of
productive differences in their potential to dif-
fer. It is in this turn to the prepersonal (connective
synthesis) that Deleuze differs from Foucault, for
instance, in discussing the regimes of desire (dis-
junctive and conjunctive syntheses). (107–10)
Colebrook walks her readers through the desiring
machines, the forms of syntheses and the ways
they may be understood (socially, historically,
politically) both legitimately (immanently and
schizoanalytically) and illegitimately (transcend-
ently and psychoanalytically). Just as she earlier
included a short example from William Blake of
how to proceed with a Deleuzian reading of a
poem on the basis of immanence, here she tries
out a short poem by Sylvia Plath as an example
of how to eschew metaphor in order to learn how
the poem works schizoanalytically. (136ff.) There
is a missed opportunity here to flag Deleuze’s
fascinating theory of writing and affect in his
readings of Jarry, Whitman, Melville and others
(beyond his better known work on Proust, Kafka,
Carroll and Artaud as he fleshed out the myriad
possibilities of minorisation).3
There is a point at which the problem of the
introductification, if you will, of Deleuze rears
its head. In her discussion of the emergence of
the signifier from the graphic material flows, as
one example of how the syntheses may be under-
stood and how it assumes a transcendent power
in relation to the surplus value of meaning,
Colebrook suggests to us that this is the very
question of how the sign of Deleuze’s thought
that she is producing will be taken. For the
signifier, as she points out, becomes despotic
because it ‘presents itself not as the production
or synthesis of relations and transformations but
as the representation of some preceding mean-
ing. Western culture in general suffers from this
“interpretosis”.’ (120) The replacement of a
frozen ‘Deleuze’ by the sign of the introduction
is a grave danger for the academic writer as
reading is then displaced onto secondary and
tertiary sources and thinking becomes ‘canned’,
like elevator music or pathetic introductory level
lectures. This is not inevitable and I do not
wish to exaggerate the danger, but it is there
nonetheless.
Colebrook then turns her attention to the role
of perception in the ‘non-interpretive’ approach
to life: ‘Perception is used by Deleuze in its
broadest possible sense, as a connection, inter-
action or encounter with the plane of life.’ (140)
Perception is an event grasped molecularly, but
on a continuum right up to the human brain
(the theatre in which actuality is screened) that
slows down, delays and mediates perception,
in the process forming assemblages (for example,
faciality) and overcoding them (for example, the
hand withdraws and becomes a tool) with the
assistance of technical machines. The technical
machine at issue is cinema, which can be used
to perceive perception through certain images
of movement and time. Colebrook writes elegant-
ly and insightfully on slowness in perception—
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Bigelow’s Blue Steel, Chantal Akerman’s Jeanne
Dielman, 23 Quai du Commerce, 1080 Bruxelles,
Spike Lee’s Do the Right Thing, and Raul Ruiz’s
Three Crowns of a Sailor) ‘mark the move from
thinking of film as a textual system to thinking
of it as an art of movement and of duration’.
(xiv) Following Deleuze, she argues that it is
through a disturbance of narrative time that an
encounter with the image that resists concep-
tualisation is able to occur. ‘If we concede this
experience’, she claims that we must acknowl-
edge that ‘there is a gap between the seeable
and the sayable’, and that ‘[t]o acknowledge this
gap is … a way of conceding the role of mimetic
mentorship to film’. (223)
And yet, if we are to take seriously Jaya-
manne’s claim that Benjamin’s and Adorno’s con-
ception of mimesis is ‘a guiding star’ for the book,
then there are points in this book in which much
more could have been said about the politics of
mimesis and where mimetic forms of perception
might take us. Although Jayamanne discusses
and enacts, in detail, the relationship between
cinema and the mimetic forms of knowledge
which it enables, the ways in which these knowl-
edges could be brought to bear on the exigencies
of the present is often elided or understated. In
the light of Jayamanne’s claim that ‘[t]his is a
book of film criticism, nothing but film criti-
cism’, my concerns in this regard may be ill-
founded. I do think, however, that it would be
a shame for film studies to risk—in the name
of film studies itself—distancing its concerns
from the active politics for which feminist film
theory of the 1970s stood so strongly.
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slowing down perception introduces order. Cin-
ema ‘mobilizes perceptions’ (149) and gives
access to movement that our perception other-
wise immobilises (that is, locates in point of
view). The virtual for Deleuze is an inhuman
power of slowness. (168) The two images of
cinema—movement- and time-image—keep
space open and mobile and reveal the possibility
of experiencing the duration of time, that is, a
virtual, differing time—a time ‘untamed’ by
order, sequence and spatialisation, (159) a time
that is disruptive of actuality.
Cultural studies as it is practiced today has
difficulty confronting immanence; immanence
is the ‘crucial idea’ (57) of Deleuze’s philosophy.
Cultural studies needs, from a Deleuzian per-
spective, to be overcome or at least learn to
modify its reliance on representational thought
and open itself to reinvention, becoming able
to respond to the dynamically open flows and
becomings of life, in all their varying speeds and
durations and potentialities, beyond the human,
which is ‘just one type of imaging or perception
among others’. (69) The positive power of De-
leuzian thought, thinks Colebrook, may help
cultural studies overcome the ‘dogma of repre-
sentation’ by levelling the distinction between
reality and its representation and the actual
and virtual such that they coexist (series over
sequence; simulacra without ground).
Colebrook ends her book with a few filmic
examples of what a Deleuzian alternative to the
interpretive problems of interpretation (the po-
litical meaning of narratives) might entail. This
amounts to a fundamental reorientation towards
how intensities (for example, non-narrative) are
composed and coded and invested in styles.
Prepersonal investments produce politics prior
to meaning. This approach is, as Colebrook
admits, a ‘strict formalism’, (180) but she does
not address formalism as a problem beyond
deflecting the implication that Deleuze’s choice
of high modernist works (and here and there
she boldly dismisses postmodern works), limits
his and our own vision of art’s ability to expand
perception and see differently. Another book
can take up Deleuzian formalism as a problem.
Reading Colebrook prepares us for this task.
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